INTRODUCTION
This study augments prior research by comparing the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 302 ineffective internal control disclosures (IICs) and Big 4 auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. (2002) requires firms, on a quarterly basis, to certify in SEC filings the effectiveness of internal controls and to disclose any material weaknesses as well as any material changes in internal control since the last periodic financial report. Section 404 of SOX requires annual assessments of internal controls supporting financial reporting with an accompanying auditor attestation. Because Section 302 disclosures are quarterly, they enhance sensitivity to IICs that can be remediated by fiscal year-end and thus not reported under Section 404 provisions as detailed below. 2 See for example, Economist (2011), Market Watch (July 10, 2011 ), Wall Street Journal (September 29, 2011 and Thomson Reuters (September 30, October 19 and November 11, 2011 ) that reports, "Auditors are not properly testing U.S. companies' internal accounting controls, the head of the main auditor watchdog said, while also reiterating urgent concerns about audit firm inspections in China."
is the first to provide direct evidence regarding the IICs and auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms. These are matters of immediate and continuing interest to regulators and other firm stakeholders in the U.S., China and other countries amid ongoing lawsuits, regulatory actions and jurisdictional disputes regarding the disclosures, internal controls and audits of Chinese firms listing on non-Chinese exchanges.
Prior to and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. Congress, U.S. courts, hedge funds and the financial press into their financial disclosures and audits, with related investigations underway in other countries. 3 These investigations include requests by U.S. regulatory authorities for working papers related to audits of Chinese firms, some of which have been deemed by Chinese authorities to constitute state secrets (Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2012) .
In response to these allegations, investigations and requests, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission ( the U.S. without listing first or concurrently in China, either because they failed to satisfy 4 Indeed, the PCAOB has specifically cited challenges they face in enforcing SOX reporting requirements for U.S.-listed Chinese firms, particularly Section 302 provisions regarding internal controls in settings where audit work which has been outsourced by PCAOB-registered firms to local Chinese audit affiliates (see http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/2010-07-12_APA_6.pdf and http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/06012010_GuidanceForNon-USJurisdictions.aspx. This impasse directly undermines the position of the SEC's Deputy Chief Accountant, Brian T. Croteau, who stated that "the ability for the PCAOB to conduct the inspections that are mandated by SOX is a very important element of investor protection" ( http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch120610btc.htm).
China's listing requirements or wished to avoid related delays. Whereas Chinese regulatory authorities assume responsibility for financial disclosures of Mainland-listed Chinese firms, including those that cross-list, they consider the financial and audit reports of Chinese firms that list directly in the U.S. to be the responsibilities of U.S. exchanges and regulators. This differential treatment by Chinese regulatory authorities raises the question of whether and how the SOX Section 302 disclosures and auditors of Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S.
compare with those that cross-list with greater prior Chinese regulatory oversight. This study also provides evidence regarding these questions.
If differences exist between Chinese and matched U.S. firms in the incidence and nature of IICs, a related question is their auditor. Specifically, it is of interest to know whether differences in their IICs relate to auditor choice, and in particular, to the use of a Big 4 auditor. Prior evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors are associated with more firm material weakness disclosures under Section 404 engagements (Ge and McVay, 2005) and that audit fees are associated with more IICs under Section 302 (Hoitash et al. 2008) .
5 Big 4 firms are also less likely than smaller PCAOB-licensed auditors to rely on outsourced local Chinese affiliates for audit work in China rather than using own-firm China-based staff (Gillis, 2011 disclosures (e.g., Ghosh and Lubberink 2006; Ogneva et al. 2007; Bedard and Graham 2010; Kim et al. 2010; Ye et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Rice and Weber 2011) , pre-SOX rather than post-SOX periods (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Leone 2007) or the effects of IICs (e.g., DeFranco and Lu 2005; Doyle et al. 2007a Doyle et al. , 2007b Gupta and Nayar 2007; Hammersley et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008 , 2009 Beneish et al. 2008; Gong et al. 2009 Gong et al. , 2010 Second, this study extends research on cross-listings, in particular, how internal controls and auditors differ between Chinese domiciled firms that directly list in the U.S. versus those that cross-list (e.g., Saudagaran 1991, 1995; Karolyi 1998 Karolyi , 2006 Doidge 2004 Aggarwal et al., 2007; Zhang et al. 2007) . Specifically, our findings regarding the incidence and types of IICs exhibited by U.S.-listed Chinese firms will better equip firms, auditors and regulators to manage SOX compliance. Finally, our results extend an emerging literature on corporate governance practices that enhance the quality of accounting information available to market participants (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Reese and Weisbach 2002; Dechow et al. 2009; Goh 2009; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Johnstone et al. 2010) .
Regulatory authorities have long expressed their intent to advance and enforce provisions that improve corporate governance practices by domestic and foreign firms, with evidence on the incidence and nature of IICs an important indicator (e.g., PCAOB 2004 PCAOB , 2009 SEC 2002 SEC , 2003 .
We are unaware of prior evidence concerning auditors and SOX Section 302 IIC differences between U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms. The following sections of this study present our hypotheses, data sources, test results and conclusions, respectively.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The disclosure. Therefore, we examine SOX Section 302 disclosures so as to better capture IICs that firms are naturally reticent to report and will work hard to avoid under Section 404 provisions.
Prior studies have examined both the factors that lead firms to disclose SOX IICs (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2000b) as well as the consequences of such disclosures (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2007a) . These studies find that risk factors (organization complexity and change; auditor resignation), relative investment in internal controls, and incentives to discover and disclose are positively related to IICs. Ge and McVay (2005) describe ten types of IICs: account specific, training, period end, accounting policies, revenue recognition, segregation of duties, account reconciliation, subsidiary specific, senior management, technology issues, and no detailed disclosure. However, they aggregate these deficiencies when comparing material weakness and non-material weakness firms. Doyle et al. (2007b) extend these studies by examining material weakness disclosures finding that these disclosures are more likely for firms that are smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing rapidly, and/or undergoing restructuring. Likewise, Doyle et al. (2007a) examine material weakness in the aggregate and do not examine or compare specific types of weaknesses in their sample. For perspective, Audit Analytics identifies eighty-two potential issue categories or types of IICs that are considered in this study. In this study, we specifically compare the IICs and Big 4 auditors of U.S.-listed Chinese firms and matched U.S. counterparts to address directly ongoing debates regarding the adequacy of financial disclosures, audits and internal controls of Chinese firms reporting under SOX.
Our first research question directly addresses whether U.S.-listed Chinese firms differ from U.S. firms in the effectiveness of internal controls. Whereas prior studies (Doyle et al., 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008) have found that U.S. firms' Section 302 IIC disclosures contain useful information about earnings quality, they did not specifically examine cross-listed firms (see Karolyi (2006) for a review of the cross-listing literature). However, the detection and disclosure of IICs may be weaker in countries where investor regulatory protection and corporate governance is weak (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Lins 2003) . Ye et al. (2010) observe that, "managers of cross-listed firms have a weaker incentive to establish a sound internal control system and to expend resources and efforts in detecting and truthfully disclosing internal control deficiencies" (p. 3). Licht (2003) argues that the U.S. regulatory regime that applies to foreign firms is significantly inferior to that faced by U.S. firms and the SEC has largely adopted a "hands-off" enforcement policy toward cross-listed firms. Consistent with this view, Ye et al.
(2010) find that the association between the IIC disclosure and earnings quality is significantly weaker for cross-listed firms than for U.S. firms. This reasoning suggests the following hypothesis:
H1: U.S.-listed Chinese firms will report more SOX Section 302 IICs than U.S.-listed and domiciled firms.
Our second research question addresses differences in IICs between Chinese firms that list directly in the U.S. and those that also cross-list in China. To date, studies of foreign firms listing in the U.S. have not distinguished between foreign direct-and cross-listed firms, rather focusing on cross-listed firms only or grouping these types together. However, it is plausible to suggest that direct-listed Chinese firms will lack experience and/or be subject to less scrutiny by Singapore). By extension, China direct-listed firms could face higher hurdles given that they are not subject to the Chinese security laws (i.e., CSRC) and regulatory oversight prior to their U.S.
listings. Indeed, the SEC has has specifically targeted for investigation Chinese firms listing their shares in the U.S. in response to these concerns:
"The SEC has publicly indicated it was examining accounting and disclosure issues regarding Chinese companies that engaged in "reverse mergers," which allow companies to list on U.S. exchanges without as much regulatory scrutiny as an initial public offering. People familiar with the matter say the investigation also includes auditors, which hadn't previously been known. As part of its inquiry, the SEC has suspended trading on some Chinese companies, questioning their truthfulness about their finances and operations" (Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2011).
By this reasoning, evidence and immediacy, our second hypothesis is as follows:
Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. will report more IICs than those that cross-list in the U.S. in comparison with U.S.-listed and domiciled firms.
Extending this reasoning and recognizing the key role played by auditors in ensuring quality financial reporting, our third hypothesis addresses differences in the use of Big 4 auditors by U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, and whether these differences extend to
Chinese direct-versus cross-listed firms:
Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. will report fewer Big 4 audits than those that cross-list in the U.S. in comparison with U.S.-listed and domiciled firms.
Finally, to better understand the internal control environments of U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms and their auditors in more detail, we present evidence regarding the IIC types and Big 4 auditors reported by U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, thus setting the stage for related follow-on research. To ensure the closest possible control group matches between U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. domiciled firms, we employ two approaches. One approach identifies for each Chinese firm a single U.S. domiciled firm that matches most closely according to criteria described below. To reduce the influence of idiosyncrasies in control firms, we also form for each U.S.-listed Chinese firm a portfolio of the three most closely matched U.S.-listed U.S. domiciled firms, using mean characteristics for comparisons. As indicated in Table 1 To reduce the role of judgment in the selection of control firms, we employ a Visual Basic Applications (VBA) matching program based on industry membership, performance and size following the precedents and findings of prior studies including Ge and McVay (2005) , Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Zhang et al. (2007) . Given findings in Beasley et al. (2000) and Bell and Carcello (2000) of industry concentrations for fraud and weak internal control environments, we apply Standard Industry Code (SIC) industry membership as the first matching step. Following Krishnan (2005), we require a minimum of two SIC digits to be common, as well as ensuring that each U.S. domiciled control firm is unique. Based on SIC data obtained from Compustat, this first step results in 56 U.S. firms matched at the four-digit SIC level, 31 at the three-digit level and 111 at the two-digit level.
III. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES
Our second and third matching steps are based upon the findings of Ge and McVay (2005) , who find performance and size to be negatively associated with weaknesses in internal controls. Following Ge and McVay (2005) , we match on total assets (ASSETS) and return on assets (ROA).
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As confirmed below, this matching algorithm produces close matches by industry, Total Assets and ROA, and also by other firm characteristics including equity market values, net income, operating cash flows and revenues (see discussion of Table 2 in Section 4 below). The VBA program is likewise used to form three-firm control portfolios of U.S. Table   2 below. Table 2 ) and no less frequently than U.S.-domiciled counterparts.
IV. TEST RESULTS

Comparisons of U.S-listed Chinese and matched U.S. domiciled firms
Univariate analysis
Apart from firm age, these subsets of Chinese firms do not differ significantly in other firm characteristics compared with their U.S. counterparts, lending further support to the validity of the matching procedure.
Altogether, the univariate results strongly support our hypotheses regarding IIC and Big 4 auditor differences between U.S.-listed Chinese and matched U.S. firms. Our results also reveal an important distinction between Chinese direct-and cross-listed firms: Chinese firms that cross-list in both the U.S. and China exhibit significantly fewer IICs, lower returns on assets, larger assets, larger equity market values, greater use of Big 4 auditors, lower revenue growth and more years of SEC registration than Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. In fact, it is seen that differences in IICs between U.S.-listed Chinese and U.S. firms are attributable to direct-versus cross-listed Chinese firms that are also subject to added regulatory oversight in China. However, one might suggest that these differences might be explained alternatively by differences in Big 4 audits, firm size and age. For example BIG 4 AUDITOR is positively and significantly correlated with MARKET CAP (p < 0.05) and FIRM AGE (p < 0.10), and both BIG 4 AUDITOR and FIRM AGE are positively and significantly correlated with INEFFECTIVE IC (p < 0.05). To control for these associations, we provide a multivariate analysis below. As reported in Table 4 , the model is statistically significant with a likelihood ratio Chisquare of 539.715 and p-value < 0.0001. The coefficient estimates for LOG OF ASSETS and LOG OF MARKET VALUE are significant (p < 0.01) and negative, in the same direction as reported by Ge and McVay (2005) . Similarly, the estimates for AUDIT FEES are significant (p < 0.01) and positive, in the same direction as reported by Hoitash et al. (2007) , implying that larger firms are less likely to have IICs. In contrast, the coefficient estimate for BIG 4 AUDITOR is significant (p < 0.01) and negative, in the opposite direction as that reported by Ge and McVay (2005) Audit Analytics, we classify IID types into two categories: "not effective accounting" internal control issues and "not effective other" internal control issues.
______________________
Panel A of Table 6 indicates that U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclose seven "accounting" type IICs and eight "other" type IICs significantly more often than their matched U.S. domiciled counterparts, with all differences statistically significant beyond the .10 level. However, Panels B and C reveal that these combined sample results largely reflect IICs for Chinese direct-listers that differ significantly from those of Chinese cross-listers. Mirroring Panel A, Panel B indicates that direct-listed Chinese firms have significantly more "accounting" IICs relating to financial statement preparation (n = 34 versus 3 for U.S. counterparts); current asset and collectables (n = 17 versus 1 for U.S. counterparts); and related parties and subsidiaries (n = 17 versus 3 for U.S. counterparts). These findings may reflect fewer accountants in China familiar with U.S. accounting standards, the ongoing transition of China's economy from state ownership with traditionally historical-cost-based asset valuations, less formal cash-focused transaction accounting, and generally less transparent ownership structures involving elaborate cross holdings between dozens and even hundreds of entities. Table 6 about here. ______________________ Among the "other" IIC types, direct-listed Chinese firms exhibit significantly more IICs relating to personnel (n = 59 versus 16 for U.S. counterparts); previously reported SOX Section 404 issues (n = 50 versus 16 for U.S. counterparts); and period-end adjustments and corrections (n = 17 versus 3 for U.S. counterparts). These findings may reflect a lack of qualified financial management talent to manage and translate formal systems of documentation that a Chinese firm might have, "tone at the top" to prioritize the remediation of weaknesses, and generally lower emphasis on fraud prevention in a traditionally "gifting" cultural milieu emphasizing personal relationships rather than common-law-based contracting. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Combined, the findings above lend strong support to hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Specifically, U.S.-listed Chinese firms disclose IICs significantly more often than matched U.S. domiciled firms in fiscal year 2009, consistent with hypothesis 1. Consistent with hypothesis 2, these differences are attributable primarily to Chinese firms that directly list in the U.S. rather than to those that cross-list both in the U.S. and China and are thus subject to greater oversight by Chinese regulatory authorities. Our evidence also supports hypothesis 3 in suggesting that Flags a problem involving the formulation or implementation of an effective code of ethics. This includes but is not limited to the following cases: an ethics code is newly or recently adopted (implying a previous non-adoption); more vigorous attempts to educate management or employees with respect to the code; revisions in the code; institution of a requirement to sign the code.
Demographic in nature -small size of company is stated to impact controls (Key 66)
This category is demographic in nature and identifies registrants that are claiming that they have internal or disclosure control deficiencies that derive from financial, size or similar issues. It does not generally include issues associated with segregation of duty issues that are covered elsewhere. Whistleblower policy related issues (Key 82) Indicates a disclosure or internal control issue involving an inadequate or insufficientlyimplemented whistleblower policy (also called an 'ethics hotline' or 'anonymous hotline'). Other (Key 50) A general catch all for disclosure control issues. It can include a range of issues associated with the financial close process including issues with timely gathering of data for use in the close process to the application of the appropriate FASB principles in the recording. It can also include issues with accounting policies and procedures that prevent timely, accurate or complete information from being reported.
